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School Turnaround: Cristo Rey Boston High School Case 
Study
Jeff Thielman
Cristo Rey Boston High School, Massachusetts
The mandates of the federal No Child Left Behind Law, including the threat of clos-
ing a school for underperformance, have led to multiple public school turnaround 
attempts.  Because turnaround is a relatively new area of focus in education, there 
is limited research on what does and does not work, and even the definition of 
turnaround is a work in progress.  The research that is available is almost exclu-
sively from the public school sector.  This article gives some history and context for 
school turnarounds currently taking place in the United States and describes the 
turnaround of a Catholic, inner-city high school in the Archdiocese of Boston.  The 
school, Cristo Rey Boston High School—formerly North Cambridge Catholic High 
School—has a history spanning nearly 100 years.  Unlike a public school, North 
Cambridge Catholic High School was not subject to closure or takeover for consis-
tently poor student performance on standardized tests. Instead, the principal and 
his faculty were driven by their own desire to improve the quality of education they 
were offering their students.  
Cristo Rey Boston High School (formerly North Cambridge Catholic High School) is an example of a self-directed school turnaround in which a principal and a core group of dedicated teachers had the au-
tonomy and flexibility needed to strengthen the curriculum, change the school 
schedule, improve instructional practices, and address staffing issues.  Their 
efforts dramatically improved student outcomes and created a new culture for 
teaching and learning.  In an era of federally mandated turnaround strategies, 
the changes initiated at Cristo Rey Boston High School are indicative of what 
can be accomplished when a dedicated leader and a core group of inspired 
teachers are motivated and empowered to provide a better education to the 
students they are teaching.  
Although most schools aspire to ongoing improvement, school turnarounds 
as we think of them today are most often externally driven (Calkins, Guenther, 
Belfiore, & Lash, 2007; Pappano, 2010). Under the federal No Child Left Be-
hind law, state departments of education review all public schools annually to 
determine if they are making progress toward the goal of all students reaching 
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grade-level academic proficiency (Massachusetts Department of Elementary 
and Secondary Education, 2011; U.S. Department of Education, 2006).  Failure 
to ensure growth in student learning over consecutive years results in a series 
of increasingly prescriptive interventions that include the development and 
implementation of a school improvement plan, placement in a specific restruc-
turing category, or closure (U.S. Department of Education, 2006).  
Catholic schools do not operate under the mandates and scrutiny of federal 
education laws.  Absent rigorous accountability structures that ensure data 
transparency and systemic supports, private and Catholic schools must address 
change internally.  The lesson from this case study of a Catholic high school is 
that an internal effort to improve the quality of education, even if the impetus 
for change is an external imperative to save the school, is necessary for a suc-
cessful turnaround.      
School Turnaround: Impetus and Definition
School performance declines for a variety of reasons.  In his study of schools 
that were adequate or good performers and subsequently became underper-
formers, Duke (2008) identified 11 symptoms of decline.  These included: 1.) 
the absence of a method to identify and assist learning problems and deficits 
in students not on Individual Education Plans (IEPs); 2.) the poor monitor-
ing of student progress; 3.) an inflexible daily school schedule; 4.) classroom 
instruction not aligned with state standards; 5.) staff development unrelated to 
core academic issues; 6.) a lack of “clear academic focus;” 7.) poor leadership; 
8.) a tendency to make hires too quickly; 9.) increased class size; 10.) a high 
number of untrained people working with students; and, 11.) increases in stu-
dent behavior problems.
Whatever the reason for decline, most schools become candidates for turn-
around because of external pressures, such as the realization that students 
might not graduate for failure to pass a state exam (Szachowicz, 2010), or the 
possibility of entering the restructuring category under federal education regu-
lations (Calkins et al., 2007).  Laura Pappano (2010), the author of Inside School 
Turnarounds, defines a turnaround as follows:   
School turnaround–this adrenaline-charged moment that we are pres-
ently in–is about rapid and dramatic improvement not just in test 
scores but also in culture, attitude, and student aspirations.  It is marked 
not by orderly implementation but by altering a lot at once and being 
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willing to step in and change–and change again.  It is a new paradigm 
for education, one not about trusting the process but about seeking 
results, both measurable and immeasurable. (p. 3) 
A 2007 report by Mass Insight defines a school turnaround “as the integrated, 
comprehensive combination of fundamental changes in program, people, con-
ditions, and (sometimes, but not necessarily) management and governance re-
quired to interrupt the status quo and put a school on a new track towards high 
performance” (Calkins et al., 2007, p. 71).  A requirement of a turnaround under 
federal law is that gains in student achievement occur within two years followed 
by a period of sustained improvement and growth.  Consequently, most observ-
ers view school turnarounds as a “distinct professional discipline that requires 
specialized experience, training, and support” (Calkins et al., 2007, p. 4). 
Under the federal government’s Race to the Top initiative, schools qualify 
for funding under the Title I School Improvement Grant program only if 
states have a process to identify their lowest-performing schools in low-in-
come communities and transform those schools using one of the following 
intervention models (U.S. Department of Education, School Improvement 
Grant Program):
 • Turnaround: Replace the principal and rehire no more than 50% of the 
staff.  The principal must have sufficient flexibility to implement a com-
prehensive improvement strategy.
 • Restart: Convert or close and reopen a school under an alternative educa-
tion management organization.
 • School closure: Close a school and enroll students in a higher-achieving 
district school.
 • Transformation: Engage in a change process that includes: 1) replacing 
the principal and improving teacher and leader effectiveness; 2) improv-
ing instruction; 3) extending learning time and strengthening community 
partnerships; 4) providing school leaders additional autonomy, flexibility, 
and support.
There are examples of individual schools successfully adopting these in-
tervention models, but they have not been taken to scale on a statewide or 
national level (Calkins et al., 2007).  Case studies by Mass Insight include 
only a few years of promising test data with limited detail on the specific ac-
tions leaders took to change school culture and practices (Mass Insight, 2009a; 
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2009b).  At the school site level, a turnaround happens when teachers change 
the way they teach, students understand the school’s vision and work harder to 
meet it, and effective leadership is in place to ensure progress (Elmore, 2004; 
Fullan, 2006; Pappano, 2010).  
The Role of Leadership in School Turnarounds
The emerging research on turnarounds suggests that success requires effec-
tive leadership (Duke, 2008; Elmore, 2000; Institute for Strategic Leadership 
and Learning, 2012).  The principal chosen to lead a turnaround must be an 
instructional leader who will focus on improving teaching and student per-
formance, with an understanding that all other duties associated with school 
management support this primary responsibility (Elmore, 2000; Fullan, 2006). 
Successful turnaround leaders have high expectations for students, are called 
to the “moral mission” (Pappano, 2010, p. 22) of providing a quality education 
to low-income, urban young people, and possess the persistence to overcome 
setbacks and support student achievement (Leithwood, Harris, & Strauss, 
2010).  For Kanter (2004), “every turnaround starts with the same overriding 
challenge: the need to make unpopular decisions about a situation whose full 
ugliness has been denied, and yet, at the same time, restore people’s confidence 
that they can start winning again” (p. 164).
Turning around a school requires a leader who can focus on what Wagner 
et al. (2005) define as the seven disciplines for strengthening instruction: 1.) ur-
gency for instructional improvement using real data; 2.) shared vision of good 
teaching; 3.) meetings about the work; 4.) a shared vision of student outcomes; 
5.) effective supervision; 6.) ongoing professional development; and, 7.) diag-
nostic data with collaboration.  Schools that have made rapid improvements 
are led by principals who galvanize “both individual and collective responsibil-
ity for the improved achievement of all students through a variety of deliber-
ate improvement structures, expectations, practices and continuous feedback” 
(Institute for Strategic Leadership and Learning, 2012, p. 6).  
Turning Around Failing High Schools
Research suggests that turning around a high school is more challenging than 
an elementary or middle school, in part, because high school students are 
highly influenced by peers and parental involvement generally declines (Duke 
& Jacobson, 2011). However, effective turnarounds are particularly important 
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at the high school level because they shape students’ futures “in starkly con-
crete ways, determining whether they struggle with poverty or find a road to 
financial and social stability” (Pappano, 2010, p. 7).  In their study of successful 
high school turnarounds in Texas, Duke and Jacobson (2011) explored how 
focused changes in ninth grade curricula, school schedules, academic supports, 
teacher teams for incoming freshmen, along with efforts to strengthen com-
munity engagement through orientation programs for transitioning middle 
school students improved student outcomes.  Other high schools, such as 
Brockton High School in Massachusetts, have significantly improved school 
performance by implementing a structured literacy format in each classroom 
and tracking student achievement at the teacher level (Ferguson, Hackman, 
Hanna, & Ballantine, 2010; Jonas, 2011; Szachowicz, 2010).
In their study of 15 successful high school turnarounds, Ferguson et al. 
(2010) identified five steps that were critical:
1. Accepting responsibility to lead change.
2. Adoption of a clear mission with focused priorities to improve student 
outcomes.
3. Strategies and plans for high-quality adult learning.
4. Development of quality standards to judge teacher and student work.
5. Skillful and continuous attention to implementing plans, monitoring 
progress, and providing necessary supports and incentives to change.
As outlined in the remainder of this study, each of these steps was critical to 
the turnaround at Cristo Rey Boston High School.  
A Catholic School Turnaround Model: Cristo Rey Jesuit High School
The story of Cristo Rey Boston High School must be viewed in the context of 
the Cristo Rey movement and the founding of the first Cristo Rey school.  In 
1996, after a lengthy feasibility study, the Society of Jesus (the Jesuits) opened 
a new school on the southwest side of Chicago called Cristo Rey Jesuit High 
School, which served a largely Mexican American community known as Pilsen/
Little Village.  During the feasibility study, which took place from 1993 to 1994, 
many parents told the Jesuits they were interested in sending their children to a 
safe Catholic high school because of the “poor performance, overcrowding, and 
sometimes dangerous conditions in local public schools” (Kearney, 2008, p. 55).  
The school was structured around a unique work-study program designed 
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and implemented by Preston Kendall, a graduate of the Kellogg Graduate 
School of Business and a former insurance company executive who served as 
the first work-study director. Initially developed as a way to fund the school, 
the work-study program became an academic and experiential pathway to col-
lege that showed students they had a place in corporate America.  Each stu-
dent worked one 8-hour day per week, and once per month worked twice per 
week (Table 1).  Students worked five days or 40 hours per month and had 15 
days of academic classes (Kearney, 2008). Teams of four students shared full-
time, 40-hour per week, entry-level jobs.  
Table 1: Cristo Rey School Work Study Schedule
                   MON             TUE              WED              THU               FRI
Week 4
Week 3
Week 2
Week 1
Student D
Student C
Student B
Student A
Student A
Student A
Student A
Student A
Student B
Student B
Student B
Student B
Student C
Student C
Student C
Student C
Student D
Student D
Student D
Student D
M   T         W       TH      F
Performing needed entry-level duties in a corporate setting made the aca-
demic work relevant, taught them about the high expectations of the work-
place, provided them with real-world experience and professional contacts, and 
showed students what was available to them if they completed high school and 
college.  Established as a separate corporation from the high school and struc-
tured as an employment agency, the work-study business program employed 
each student and contracted their services to Chicago area businesses.  During 
the summer, incoming Cristo Rey students engaged in an intensive 3-week 
training program where they learned basic office skills and etiquette, including 
proper attire, communications, and behavior (Kearney, 2008).
Cristo Rey students did not retain any of the money they earned; it all 
went to the cost of their college preparatory education at a private Catholic 
school.  The program was designed to generate up to 70% of the school’s op-
erating costs, with remaining expenses raised through traditional fundraising 
from donors and foundations and a modest tuition charged each family based 
121School Turnaround
on their ability to pay (Kearney, 2008).  A primary selling point for local busi-
nesses was that students would do real work that added value to the workplace. 
Underscoring this goal, businesses paid for student employees through their 
operating budgets rather than their charitable arm.  Cristo Rey marketed the 
program as a way for companies to get work done and a means by which cor-
porations could help urban youth receive a college preparatory education.  The 
combination of doing real work that a corporation would pay for and using 
that income to afford a private, college preparatory education made the Cristo 
Rey model distinct from traditional high school work-study programs such 
as job shadowing, internships and mentoring, or career academies in which 
students take academic courses and classes that relate to an academy theme 
(Stern, Wu, Dayton, & Maul, 2007; Stone & Aliaga, 2007).  
Over the course of their 4-year high school career, each student spent the 
equivalent of 1 academic year working in a business.  While there has been 
no empirical study of the impact of the Cristo Rey work-study program on 
student learning, students from the high dropout neighborhood in Chicago 
who participated in a mandatory work-study program were showing up to 
school every day (Kearney, 2008).  A report from Cristo Rey Network with 
data from the National Student Clearinghouse later would show that 87% of 
all Cristo Rey school graduates of the class of 2008 enrolled in college within 
12 months of graduation from high school (Cristo Rey Network, 2011a), a sig-
nificantly higher college going rate than Latinos (62%) and Blacks (56%) na-
tionwide who graduated high school in 2008, and a higher college going rate 
than Whites (72%) nationally (National Center for Education Statistics, 2010). 
Cristo Rey Jesuit High School’s Academic Model 
Academically, Cristo Rey Jesuit High School was organized as a college prepa-
ratory high school (Kearney, 2008).  The school’s founding principal, Sr. Judith 
Murphy, OSB, and a committee of educators who advised her, understood that 
urban students needed a different academic experience than what was offered 
in a traditional high school. At the same time that Cristo Rey Jesuit High 
School was opening, the National Association of Secondary School Princi-
pals (NASSP) published Breaking Ranks:  Changing an American Institution 
(NASSP, 1996).  The report documented emerging research that concluded 
that high schools had become irrelevant for millions of young people, espe-
cially those who were poor. Breaking Ranks called for a curriculum that con-
nected to “real-life applications of knowledge,” assessments aligned with the 
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curriculum, and individualized learning (NASSP, 1996, pp. 11-19).  The report, 
moreover, recommended that high schools create small units of no more than 
600 students to improve relationships and student engagement, and urged 
school leaders to forge closer ties to businesses and community organizations 
(NASSP, 1996).
By 1999-2000, its fourth year of operation, the Cristo Rey Jesuit High 
School attracted considerable corporate and philanthropic support in great-
er Chicago.  In January of 2000 the school opened a new facility, boasted a 
small endowment, and, most importantly, had graduates going to college.  The 
school’s success caught the attention of other Catholic educators who visited 
the Chicago school and sought to replicate the program in other cities.
Replicating Cristo Rey Jesuit High School
In June of 2000, venture capitalist B.J. Cassin visited Cristo Rey Jesuit High 
School and was moved by what he saw.  Shortly after his visit he launched a 
foundation that would contribute $12 million to the scale-up of Cristo Rey 
Jesuit High School across the country, and he hired me to run it.  In 2001 I 
left Cristo Rey Jesuit High School, where I had served 3 years as develop-
ment director, and moved back to Boston to manage the foundation out of 
an office at Boston College. In 2003, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 
made a $9.9 million commitment to the replication effort, and three years later 
added another $6 million to replicate schools and build the capacity of the 
national Cristo Rey Network office. The Cristo Rey Network was formally 
established as a 501(c) (3) organization in 2003 and tasked with managing the 
growth and quality of the schools (Cristo Rey Network, 2011b).  Network staff 
worked with local agents to conduct feasibility studies for new schools, taught 
the work-study model to local leadership, conducted site visits to the original 
school, and gathered best practices that were emerging from the new schools. 
Ultimately, the network office, which was located in Chicago, was responsi-
ble for ensuring that every member school adhered to the Cristo Rey Network 
Mission Effectiveness Standards, which defined the standards by which the 
schools operate.  The 10 standards (most recently revised in July 2012) ensure 
that an individual school:
1. Is explicitly Catholic in mission and enjoys Church approval.
2. Serves only economically disadvantaged students. The school is open 
to students of various faiths and cultures.
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3. Is family centered and plays an active role in the local community.
4. Prepares all of its students to enter and graduate from college. 
5. Requires participation by all students in the work-study program. All 
students must be 14-years-old on or before September 1st.
6. Seeks to integrate the learning present in its work program, classroom, 
and extracurricular experiences for the fullest benefit of its student 
workers.
7. Has an effective administrative and board structure as well as complies 
with all applicable state and federal laws.
8. Is financially sound. At full enrollment the school is primarily depen-
dent on revenue from the work-study program to meet operating ex-
penses. In addition, the school maintains a comprehensive advance-
ment program to ensure financial stability.
9. Supports its graduates’ efforts to obtain a college degree. 
10. Is an active participant in the collaboration, support, and development 
of the Cristo Rey Network.
From 2001 to 2009, the network oversaw 32 feasibility studies, which re-
sulted in the establishment of 25 Cristo Rey high schools, all of which were 
located near large urban centers where there was a concentration of both stu-
dents and corporate jobs.  The feasibility study required new schools to secure 
commitments from potential corporate sponsors, identify school leadership, 
demonstrate an ability to adhere to the network’s standards, and produce a 
plan to raise money.  We gave little direction to local schools on how to estab-
lish their academic program.  Principals of new schools visited Cristo Rey Je-
suit in Chicago and other schools to learn about the academic schedule and to 
pick up copies of any written curriculum available, but each school developed 
its own approach to teaching and learning, just as the original school had done. 
In 2006 the network hired its first academic officer and began requiring new 
schools to adopt a standard curriculum framework and common assessments 
in 2011.  These were developed by teachers and principals from several Cristo 
Rey schools.  
North Cambridge Catholic High School
North Cambridge Catholic High School had a long history of serving Irish, 
Italian, and French immigrant families in Cambridge, Massachusetts and 
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nearby communities.  The school was originally St. John High School, which 
opened in 1921, and includes former U.S. House Speaker Thomas P. “Tip” 
O’Neill among its alumni (North Cambridge Catholic High School, 2009). 
The school was part of the central high school system of the Roman Catholic 
Archdiocese of Boston.  Each central school had a governing board, with prin-
cipal appointments and some financial support coming from the Archdiocese. 
Central schools covered most of their operating expenses with revenue from 
tuition and had advisory committees to help raise funds (North Cambridge 
Catholic High School, 2002).
By the 1980s, North Cambridge Catholic High School, with its proud 
tradition of serving working-class and immigrant families, was drawing fewer 
students from rapidly gentrifying local communities that had been home to 
most of its students.  Consequently, the school began to recruit young people 
from Boston, Chelsea, Everett, Revere, and other cities. Within a decade, the 
majority of students were Latino, African American, Cape Verdean, Haitian, 
and Vietnamese.  The school’s enrollment averaged around 250 students, and 
the school marketed itself as a place where young people with no other option 
could receive a quality education (North Cambridge Catholic High School, 
2002).
In 2001, the Archdiocese announced that by 2004 its annual subsidies to 
the central Catholic high schools would go away, the Archdiocesan Central 
School Board would disband, and each school would be expected to be fi-
nancially self-sufficient (North Cambridge Catholic High School Self Study, 
2002).  In 2002, Thomas P. O’Neill, III, a former lieutenant governor of Mas-
sachusetts, chair of the school’s Board of Advisors, and school alumnus, pro-
posed converting North Cambridge Catholic to a Cristo Rey school.  The 
timing was ideal because the Sisters of Notre Dame de Namur had just studied 
the feasibility of opening a Cristo Rey school in either Boston or Lawrence, a 
city just south of the New Hampshire border that happened to be the poor-
est municipality in New England (North Cambridge Catholic High School, 
2002). The Sisters’ decision to open a school in Lawrence left greater Boston, a 
larger metropolitan area with more potential for corporate placements, open 
to North Cambridge Catholic High School.  
North Cambridge Catholic High School becomes a Cristo Rey School
In the summer of 2002, North Cambridge Catholic High School conducted 
a self-study to determine if the school could become a Cristo Rey school.  Fr. 
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Jose Medina, a newly ordained priest who taught at North Cambridge Catho-
lic High School during the 2000-2001 school year before earning a master’s 
degree in education from Harvard University, wrote the study report (North 
Cambridge Catholic High School Self Study, 2002). 
In early 2003, North Cambridge Catholic High School gained membership 
in the Cristo Rey Network, which authorized the distribution of $1,253,000 of 
Gates and Cassin funds to the school over a 4-year period to hire new staff, 
purchase vehicles to transport students to and from their placements, and train 
students for work. The school’s new work-study director, Terry Gupta, worked 
to ensure that the practices of the original Chicago program were implement-
ed in Cambridge.  A new dress code that required students to dress profession-
ally at school and work was put in place, and students could not participate in 
athletics on the days they worked.  Moreover, the school could no longer ac-
cept undocumented students because the program required that every student 
be eligible to work. 
North Cambridge Catholic as a Cristo Rey school: 2004-2007
North Cambridge Catholic had 234 students in 2004-2005, its first year as a 
Cristo Rey school (Cristo Rey Network, 2011a).  Sr. Ellen Powers, CSJ, the 
school’s long-term principal, was now president, Bob McCarthy, the assistant 
principal, became the principal, and David Paskind, who had taught at the 
school for many years, became the assistant principal.  In a Cristo Rey school, 
like many Catholic schools, the president is the head of the institution respon-
sible for maintaining the school mission, and is accountable to the Board of 
Trustees and the religious sponsor ( James, 2009).  The president is the school’s 
primary representative to external audiences and is responsible for the school’s 
finances.  The principal oversees the academic and student life program, and 
is co-equal on the organizational chart to the work-study director, develop-
ment director, and chief financial officer.  This structure frees the principal from 
spending time on fund-raising and external issues ( James, 2009).
In 2006, after 2 years as the head of school under the new model, Sr. Ellen 
Powers, CSJ, was asked by her religious congregation to move into a leader-
ship position within the order, and Bob McCarthy became acting president 
and principal.  In the spring of 2007, McCarthy was named president of the 
school, and he hired Fr. Jose Medina, who had returned to Boston after work-
ing for 4 years at an all-girls Catholic high school in Washington, DC, to be 
the school’s principal.  
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The New Leader Finds a School in Decline
Fr. Medina began work on July 1, 2007, and immediately scheduled individual 
meetings with all 18 faculty members to learn about his staff and to gain a 
deeper understanding of the school he was about to lead.  The meetings con-
firmed what he suspected—the school was in decline.  Faculty and staff told Fr. 
Medina that the school was successful because each year top graduates went to 
prominent universities, and the school maintained a strong and vibrant com-
munity spirit.  Medina, however, learned that teachers chose what they would 
teach in their subject area and determined on their own to what degree to 
monitor student progress toward specific learning goals.  There were no tools 
for aligning the curriculum with state standards, or even to align the curricu-
lum across grades and within each grade.  
Because the Cristo Rey Network required it, all students took the Iowa 
Test of Educational Development (ITED), and many took PSATs and SATs. 
When Medina asked his teachers if they ever looked at the data, some told 
him they used it to identify where students needed additional support but 
there was no systematic analysis of test scores, nor was the data used to make 
changes to instruction.   
He learned that a faculty planning committee, which met monthly, often 
advocated for professional development, but had limited success making any 
substantial changes to the staff development program or the curriculum it-
self.  Grade level meetings focused on discipline issues and academic failures 
rather than improving teaching and learning.  Teachers were rarely observed 
or evaluated; a good teacher was one who could maintain discipline in the 
classroom.  There were six 60-minute periods a day with no study periods, no 
double blocks, and no difference in the time allocated per subject.  The transi-
tion to the Cristo Rey model had given teachers more free periods, but the 
schedule did not permit common planning time with other teachers in their 
discipline or grade level, and students were often not available when teachers 
had a free period.
Most significantly, Medina learned in his interviews with staff that they 
did not believe students could achieve at higher levels and were not taking re-
sponsibility for student learning.  It was common for teachers to say, “I taught 
it, but the students didn’t do their homework or didn’t study enough.”  
Turnaround Stage 1:  Creating Conditions for Improvement, 2007-08
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Prior to the start of the 2007-2008 school year and after meeting with each 
faculty member, Medina decided to make several changes, which were an-
nounced at a faculty meeting in August.  First, he lengthened the school day by 
15 minutes and eliminated the rotating schedule so each class could be taught at 
the same time each day.  He also added three professional days to the schedule 
to focus on ways to improve instruction.  Medina then set up email accounts 
for all faculty and students so they could communicate with one another, and 
he announced that grades would be available online to improve transparency 
for students and parents.  Finally, Medina shifted many of his administrative 
responsibilities to the assistant principal, David Paskind, so he could focus on 
developing a strategy to improve instruction.  
In addition to meeting with his teachers, Medina spent the summer analyz-
ing the school’s scores on the ITED, which he presented to the faculty at the 
August meeting.  He showed that the majority of students graduating from 
the school were below grade level and had not advanced a full academic year 
in each of the 3 years they took the ITED.  This was especially troubling since 
the class of 2008 had spent all 4 years as students in the Cristo Rey program. 
The faculty doubted the scores.  “Many of us criticized the test and questioned 
what the results were telling us,” English teacher Carrie Wagner explained.  “It 
didn’t seem possible that our students were making such little progress.”
Setting the Stage for Change:  Effective Models and Data Analysis
During a professional day in October 2007, Medina decided to send all of his 
teachers to a number of high-performing charter schools in Boston, including 
some of the middle schools that were feeders to North Cambridge Catholic 
High School.  Many of the teachers visited the MATCH Charter School, 
which served students in grades nine through 12, and two middle schools, 
Roxbury Preparatory Charter School and Excel Academy.  The three schools 
served low-income students and had impressive outcomes improving students’ 
academic achievement.    
At the MATCH School, North Cambridge teachers learned about a pro-
ficiency test the school used to assess the math and literacy skills students 
needed to master prior to entering ninth grade.  The proficiency program was 
designed to remediate students who were not at grade level.  MATCH also of-
fered Advanced Placement (AP) courses and required all students to take one 
AP class during their junior year and at least one AP or college course during 
their senior year. The teachers saw students from low-income backgrounds—
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the same students they taught—taking AP classes. “Why can’t we do this?” 
wondered Wagner.  
The visits to Roxbury Prep and Excel Academy sparked a conversation 
about changing the freshmen curriculum.  The two middle schools offered 
double block classes of math and language arts so that students could have 
enough time to study the subject matter.  For mathematics, the charter schools 
offered one class in math skills followed by another in problem solving. In 
English, Roxbury Prep and Excel Academy offered one period for reading and 
another for language arts.  At a meeting of Cristo Rey Network principals in 
October of 2007, Medina talked to school leaders who had doubled the time 
for math and language arts in the freshman year.  
Fr. Medina met with the staff of the New England Regional Office of the 
College Board in Waltham, Massachusetts, to get a better understanding of 
what was expected of students when they entered college.  Their advice was 
to intensify the ninth grade experience and add AP classes as soon as possible 
in the upper grades. His discussions with College Board confirmed what the 
faculty learned at the MATCH School.  Adding AP courses would soon have 
some empirical research to support it.  A College Board study by University of 
Texas researchers concluded that students who took at least one AP course and 
test had higher college GPAs and graduation rates than students who took no 
AP courses (Hargrove, Godin, & Dodd, 2008).  “The AP classes would give 
us the right target,” explained Medina.  “We needed to start with the end goal 
and work backward to accelerate learning so that students could be ready for 
AP level work in their senior year.”
Confronting Reality:  Fall 2007 ITED Results Show No Change
When the results of the 2007 ITED came back in November, they reaffirmed 
what Fr. Medina noted earlier (see Table 2).  The Normative Curve Equivalent 
(NCE) scores measure where a student falls on a normal curve, indicating 
the student’s rank compared to other students on the same test.  The scores 
of the class of 2008, the seniors that year and the first group in the converted 
school to experience all 4 years under the Cristo Rey model, were particularly 
troubling.  In the fall of 2007, the class of 2008 scored 264.7 in reading, which 
placed them below the 10th grade level (more than a year behind where they 
needed to be) and again meant they had made less than a year’s worth of aca-
demic growth since the previous year’s ITED.  
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Table 2: Report of Fall 2007 ITED Normative Curve Equivalent Scores
 
Note: Each color represents where a student should be by the end of each grade.  For example, a ninth grader 
should be scoring 260 and is marked by light green.  The majority of freshmen scores were in the 6th and 7th grade 
reading and math levels, scores marked by a pink or dark red purple color. 
The class had a median NCE raw score of 250.4 (equivalent to eighth grade) 
in reading as sophomores.  When they took the test in the fall of 2006 as ju-
niors, their median NCE raw score was 258.1 in reading, still below ninth grade 
levels.  The math results were similar, and the same trends were found for the 
sophomore and junior classes.  No changes had been made in the curriculum 
to respond to this data.  “When I reflected on the data, I felt extremely be-
trayed,” said Wagner.  “What the data revealed, if we bothered to look at it, was 
a failed endeavor.  I had dedicated 6 years to the school, and to find out that we 
were not doing a good job was really devastating.” After initially doubting the 
ITED analysis, math teacher Jill Crowley reached a similar conclusion.  “I felt 
at times that we were doing a disservice to kids,” said Crowley.  “We were not 
pushing them enough.  For example, in Algebra 1, we were not covering a full 
year of course work. Something was wrong, and Jose’s (Fr. Medina) analysis 
made it clear that we had to change.”
The dispute over the validity of the ITED scores was over.  “The Novem-
ber meeting was the first time that I had the impression that the majority of 
teachers realized that even though they were trying hard to serve our kids, it 
was not enough,” said Fr. Medina.  “They had seen other schools teaching the 
same kids we teach and doing a much better job.  There was no doubting what 
the ITED scores were saying.  Now we could talk about what we needed to do.” 
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Towards a College Preparatory Experience 
Fr. Medina began a professional development workshop by asking teachers to 
reflect on four questions:
1. How do I teach my students cognition (the intellectual process of gain-
ing knowledge) within my discipline?
2. How do I model for my students the act of knowing?
3. How do I help students know and experience the things I see and say 
in my subject matter?
4. How does what I teach increase my students’ consciousness of them-
selves?
Over the course of a 3-hour workshop, the focus was on assessments.  The 
first activity involved teachers reviewing the ITED exams and looking closely 
at sections that had to do with each teacher’s subject area.  Teachers met in 
small groups according to their subject area and discussed the logic behind 
the test questions, including what the questions were asking the students to 
demonstrate.  The teachers then discussed strategies they could implement in 
their classes to help students be better prepared to answer the ITED questions. 
The second hour involved teachers taking a look at their own assessments and 
comparing them to the standards of the College Board.  The teachers discussed 
their assessments in small groups and then reported to the larger group. “By 
this point, we realized we were all over the place when it came to assessments,” 
said Crowley.  “And, we learned that the ITED was asking questions that our 
students should have been able to answer if we had prepared them properly.” 
In the final hour of the assessment exercise, teachers took one of their assess-
ments and redesigned it based on the criteria developed from the small group 
discussion on the ITEDs.  
Fr. Medina ended with a presentation entitled “Where are we headed? 
Towards a College Prep Experience.”  He laid out a plan entitled “Coherence, 
Rigor and Relevance,” which called for consistent grading policies, consistent 
expectations of what good work looks like, scaffolding in which the teacher 
models the desired learning strategy and then shifts responsibility to students, 
and common assessments. He announced that the school’s primary focus 
would be on English and mathematics, and he explained that the schedule 
needed to change to accommodate double-block courses in math and Eng-
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lish for all freshmen and the introduction of AP courses during the students’ 
senior year. 
 Medina wanted to be sure his faculty understood that he and they to-
gether were creating a new school. He believed in his students’ capacity to do 
better academically, and he wanted to be sure his teachers did as well.  After 
calling all teachers to school after a snowstorm on December 20, 2007, Fr. 
Medina was forced to address open challenges from his staff.  Toward the 
end of the day, Medina wrote the staff an email telling them, “We are differ-
ent.  We choose to rise above an educational system that has already failed 
our students.”  He went on to point out that the ideals of helping all students 
learn came at the “price of determination,” which “can only be understood by 
our students and families when they see it in us.”  Medina ended the email 
by saying:
A group of educators becomes a community when they start thinking 
of each other as part of the same thing …As a community, we have a 
long road ahead with many tough decisions and difficulties to face.  We 
will overcome only if we choose to rise above, pour our hearts into it, 
and walk together.  I know it is possible; since with God’s help nothing 
is impossible.  I don’t give up and will be here plowing through the dif-
ficulties, no matter what!”
“In some ways, it was a defining moment,” Wagner said. “Though I didn’t par-
ticularly like the approach, the point had been made.  We were becoming a 
much different school.”  
Fr. Medina continued to use every piece of data he could find to support 
the need for changes to the curriculum and to the way teachers taught.  In 
February of 2008, he presented a report to the faculty from the National Stu-
dent Clearinghouse (NSC) on the college going rates of the school’s recent 
graduates.  While the school touted the fact that all students were accepted 
to college, not all were enrolling in college upon graduation.  There was some 
good news, however.  The class of 2007, which experienced 3 years under the 
Cristo Rey model, had 69% of its members enroll in college upon graduation. 
Fr. Medina’s previous evaluation of the school he inherited caused him to con-
clude that the work-study program, not the academic program, gave students 
the confidence they needed to go to college, and that the only way to increase 
this number further was to bolster the school’s academic efforts. 
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In February of 2008, Medina met with parents of freshmen and sopho-
mores whom he had come to know in his first months at the school. He talked 
with them about the coming academic changes, explained the work the faculty 
was doing, and explained the need to lengthen the school day.  They were in 
favor of the changes and did not object to the longer day. With the support 
of parents, Medina presented an outline of the school’s academic plans to the 
Board of Trustees, which supported his efforts.  These included double block 
classes (96 minutes per day) of math and language arts for all ninth graders and 
a proficiency program after school and during study halls to remediate skills 
students did not have when they entered the school; the introduction of college 
level work in the senior year through AP courses; extending the school day to 
3:05 p.m.; and extending the school year by one week.  
In the spring of 2008, as he was planning the 2008-2009 school year, he 
asked three faculty members to join him in the leadership of the academic 
program:  Wagner (humanities); Crowley (math); and, Leanne D’Alessandro 
Figure 1: Percentage of Cristo Rey Students Enrolled in College During the Fall 
Immediately following Graduation, 2003-2010
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(science).  The three were junior to many of the teachers they were now lead-
ing.  Crowley and Wagner remember that many faculty members were skep-
tical that Medina’s plans would work, but most were excited that the school 
finally had an academic plan.  By showing the faculty the ITED and NSC data, 
enlisting teachers to do research with him on other high-performing schools, 
and by knowing the strengths and weaknesses of his teachers, he was able to 
position the school for significant change. He did not ask teachers to step 
down, but he made it clear that the demands of teaching would become more 
intense.  Under Fr. Medina’s leadership, teachers were at the forefront of the 
turnaround efforts that would shape the school in the coming years.
 
Turnaround Stage 2:  Maintaining Survival and Realizing Improvement, 
2008-2012
Wagner and Crowley spent part of the summer of 2008 designing common 
assessments for the algebra and English courses the incoming freshmen would 
take during the 2008-2009 school year.  They also developed proficiency exams 
in math and English based on Massachusetts state standards to assess the skills 
students had to master by the end of eighth grade. Because they wanted to be 
sure students had the skills needed to do college preparatory work, Crowley, 
Wagner, and Fr. Medina decided that the passing grade for a proficiency test 
would be 90%.  Students had the opportunity to take a different version of the 
exam every month until they passed, and remediation would be based on the 
weaknesses identified on the proficiency test.
The remediation plan evolved over the course of 2008-2009. In January of 
2009, 4 months into the year, only 21 students had passed all three proficiency 
tests. In February, the school began an after-school remediation program de-
signed to teach the skill deficiencies identified in the proficiency exams. All 
students who scored below 70% (about 60 at the time) were required to take 
1 hour of remediation per week. The remediation program included general 
instruction, practice, and tutoring. Many students, however, still had trouble 
attaining the required score, often because they found difficulties in a specific 
area.  By the spring of 2009, 45 students had not passed the three proficiency 
exams and were assigned an adult tutor or a peer tutor who had already passed 
the test. Tutoring took place before and after school. Eventually, every student 
had a tutor, and as a result 38 of the remaining 45 students passed the profi-
ciency exam by the end of the year.
Increased classroom time made it possible for students to have a deeper un-
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derstanding of freshman math and English.  By second semester, math teach-
ers reported that ninth graders were more comfortable with problem solving 
activities than previous groups of first-year students.  In English, every student 
participated in literature circles where they read a book with a small group of 
peers and conducted student-led discussions to uncover key plot and character 
developments as well as themes, tone, and literary elements.  The goal was for 
students to build skills in independent learning. 
In addition to the new freshman curriculum and remediation program, in 
2008-2009 the school implemented many of the strategies from SpringBoard, 
a comprehensive program developed by the College Board to prepare students 
for AP courses. The SpringBoard curriculum and the professional develop-
ment provided by SpringBoard trainers gave the faculty a wealth of teaching 
strategies geared toward developing critical thinking skills.  Additional AP 
classes in studio art, macroeconomics, and U.S. government were created and 
by the 2009-2010 school year every senior had to take at least one AP class.  
The freshman English and math teachers held weekly department meet-
ings to discuss teaching, design lesson plans, and grade common assessments. 
In both departments, teachers graded one another’s students to ensure consis-
tency and fairness. The weekly meetings not only supported the implementa-
tion of the new initiatives but also provided a fertile ground for many conver-
sations around assessment, teaching, and learning. “The weekly meetings were 
a significant change for us,” said Crowley.  “It standardized what teachers ac-
cepted as quality work and allowed organic discussions about which teaching 
techniques produced the best results.”  
Rather than wait until the fall of 2009 for the freshmen class to take the 
next ITED, ninth graders took the spring ITED and showed impressive gains 
(see Figure 2).  Using the normative curve equivalent (NCE) as a measure of 
student growth, if all students were to make 1 year of progress, their NCE gain 
Figure 2:  Ninth Grade ITED Growth 
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would be zero.  A comparison of the spring to the fall test results showed that 
ninth grade students posted substantial academic gains by the spring of 2009: 
3.4 NCE in reading; 4.7 in writing; and 5.4 in math; and an overall academic 
gain of 5.5 NCE points in the core total. Students gained more than one aca-
demic level during the year, few students showed an academic loss, and several 
students showed academic gains of 25 points and above.  When taking into 
account previous year’s data, these academic gains were statistically significant. 
 
A Financial Crisis and Structural Change
In 2008-2009, the year North Cambridge Catholic High School launched 
its new academic program, the school had 282 students, well below the 400 
student target set in the original feasibility study (Cristo Rey Network, 2011a). 
The national economy was in a tailspin, and the school struggled to find work-
study jobs.  The school would run an operating deficit for the third consecutive 
year, and the board authorized the use of reserve funds to make ends meet. 
From 2007 to 2009, the school used more than $1 million in reserves to cover 
operating losses, reducing the school’s once comfortable savings to approxi-
mately $100,000.  
The Board of Trustees, which enthusiastically supported Fr. Medina’s effort 
to improve academics, struggled to get accurate information on the school’s 
financial picture and consequently approved budgets with unrealistic revenue 
assumptions.  Fr. Medina, alarmed by the school’s economic condition, met 
with Tom O’Neill.  In the fall of 2008, O’Neill called and asked me to take a 
look at the school and provide the board with a report.  
I made a number of recommendations to stabilize the school financially, 
including the elimination of five positions.  The school president wanted to 
wait, and the board, realizing that a change in leadership was needed immedi-
ately, asked me to take over as interim head of school in January of 2009.  For 
the next 6 months, I continued my work at the national Cristo Rey office and 
oversaw North Cambridge Catholic High School. In April of 2009 the board 
asked me to be the school’s president, and I accepted.  At the same meeting, 
the board approved my plan to restructure the school, which resulted in a net 
loss of 10.25 positions, 25% of the staff I inherited 6 months earlier.  I hired new 
leadership for the work-study and development departments and focused on 
finding work-study placements, which were critical to the school’s operating 
needs. While we eliminated many positions, we remained committed to the 
academic turnaround.  
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Continued Success through Transparency and Rebalancing Priorities
While the school focused on improving the academic program, the work-
study program suffered significant job and revenue losses.  Tom  O’Neill 
and I invited Terry Gupta, the original leader of the work-study program, to 
help the school find work-study jobs.  From January of 2009 through June 
of 2011 Gupta and O’Neill signed 69 new corporate employers.  Our success 
proved that a Cristo Rey school could succeed in greater Boston, even in a 
difficult economy. 
Since we were attempting a turnaround at the same time we were cutting 
positions, we realized we had to keep faculty and staff apprised of the changes 
being made.  I made several presentations to all staff to explain in detail the 
school’s fiscal situation, and we benchmarked the school’s fund-raising and job 
procurement performance to other Cristo Rey Network schools.  I established 
Table 3: North Cambridge Catholic Reorganization: January to June 2009
Department Positions Eliminated Positions Added Net Loss
Development Development Director, 
Sr. VP,
Executive Assistant,
Grant Writer (.5),
Leadership Society (.5)
(4.0)
Director
(1)
3.0
Business CFO
(1.0)
Financial Consul-
tant (.25)
.75
Work Study Director,
Business Development
(2.0)
Business Develop-
ment (1), Director 
(1)
(2.0)
0
School  
Support
Nurse,
College Counselor,
School Counselor,
Volunteer Coordinator (.5), 
Assistant Admissions (.5), 
Maintenance (.5),
Associate Principal (reduced to .5) 
(5.0)
Director of Coun-
seling and Well-
ness
(1.0)
4.0
Faculty Three teaching positions   
(2 math/language)
(3.0)
Part time Spanish 
teacher
(.5)
2.5
Total 15.0 FTE positions eliminated 4.75 10.25
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the practice of distributing a monthly dashboard to faculty, staff, and board 
members detailing the school’s progress on academic, work-study, develop-
ment, financial, and other goals.  The practice continues to this day. 
During the 2009-2010 school year, we made changes to the work-study 
training program, worked relentlessly to develop relationships with supervi-
sors and other contacts at corporate partners, and saw a 20% gain in revenue 
from the corporate work-study program.  By the 2011-2012 school year, 
Cristo Rey Boston High School generated $1.9 million in revenue from the 
work-study program, a 74% increase from 2008-2009.  The school increased 
its annual development revenue for operations and in June of 2012 celebrated 
3 consecutive years of modest surpluses, news that gave confidence to trustees 
and benefactors. 
Changes took place in other areas of the school as well. For the first time, all 
staff received written evaluations, a new, more personalized admissions process 
developed by Fr. Medina was instituted, the college and personal counseling 
programs were revamped, Graduate School of Social Work interns from Bos-
ton College helped do twice yearly mental health check-ins with all students, 
and the school began a volunteer program in which recent college graduates 
lived in a former rectory, received a small stipend, and gave a year of service to 
the school. 
I focused on ensuring that the school adhered closely to the Cristo Rey 
mission, particularly to the goal of serving the lowest-income students we 
could find.  The average family income of the incoming ninth graders would 
drop from $41,882 during 2008-2009 (Cristo Rey Network, 2008) to $26,013 
in 2011-12, the lowest in the Cristo Rey Network (Cristo Rey Network, 2011a). 
In the fall of 2011, 82% of our incoming students qualified for the federal free/
reduced lunch program.  
The Move to Boston
The most significant change was the school’s move to a new location across the 
street from a subway stop in Dorchester, the largest section of the city of Bos-
ton.  We had outgrown our building in Cambridge, and with more than 70% 
of our students from the city of Boston, we needed to be closer to the students 
and families we were serving.  
By September 2010 we completed a $1.5 million renovation of a former 
Catholic elementary school with revenue from the sale of the Cambridge site, 
donated labor and materials, and funds raised from foundations and individu-
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als.  A force of 576 volunteers packed and unpacked books and materials from 
the old school, patched and painted all 20 classrooms, installed white boards, 
painted hallways, refinished woodwork, and assisted with landscaping.  
The school was renamed Cristo Rey Boston High School, the national logo 
was adopted as the school’s logo, and a new mission statement calling for the 
school to educate young men and women of “faith, purpose and service” was 
drafted.  By the start of the 2011-2012 school year, the entire management team, 
except Fr. Medina and me, was new, and only a handful of staff had taught or 
worked in the former North Cambridge Catholic High School.
Fostering Teacher Effectiveness
Fr. Medina, Crowley, and Wagner continued their effort to improve instruc-
tion at a time when education policy shifted toward research suggesting that 
teachers are the most important school-level factor in student achievement 
(Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2007; Gordon, Kane, & Staiger, 2006).  In De-
cember of 2009, Wagner and Fr. Medina attended a training sponsored by 
Uncommon Schools in Albany, New York to learn new faculty professional 
development methods. During the 2010-2011 school year, the leadership team 
focused its efforts on improving pedagogy, including the quality of assess-
ments and assignments, and the pacing of classroom activities.  The school 
added more doubleblock courses, continued to require all seniors to take at 
least one AP course, and installed Smart Boards in all classrooms.  Crowley 
and Wagner also met individually with each teacher in their department to re-
view curriculum and teaching strategies. The faculty professional development 
program included the following:  
 • Twice-monthly, 2-hour faculty meetings in which teachers analyzed the 
effectiveness of methods learned from Uncommon Schools and Spring-
Board trainings. 
 • Two daylong professional development sessions during the year and three 
daylong sessions at the end of the school year to analyze midterm and 
final exams. 
 • A weekly memorandum with teaching insights provided electronically by 
the principal.
 • Informal and formal unscheduled observations, as suggested by Kim Mar-
shall, a highly regarded former Boston school principal who edits a weekly 
newsletter on best practices in education.  The observations were done 
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regularly by department heads and the school principal.  
 • Coaching of all teachers by department heads trained in the Springboard 
program.
Additionally, the faculty began an audit system that encouraged teachers 
to visit other classrooms to view the teaching techniques of their colleagues. 
Visiting teachers provided one positive and one critical comment on the class 
they observed, noted the use of classroom management skills learned in the 
professional development trainings, and reported these comments to the ob-
served teacher and designated department heads. 
Wagner and Crowley had been coordinating the freshman remediation 
program, but the burdens of running the after-school program, coaching new 
teachers, writing curriculum, and helping to manage professional development 
took their toll.  In 2010-2011, we hired a full-time director of academic sup-
port, who oversaw the remediation process, recruited and trained tutors, and 
coordinated individualized education plans (IEPs) for students.  In the spring 
of 2011, Wagner was appointed dean of curriculum and Crowley became dean 
of instruction and student life. Each would teach one class and be tasked with 
improving the quality of instruction throughout the school.   
During 2011-2012, Crowley and Wagner developed specific intervention 
plans for teachers who struggled, and they began work on a 2-year project to 
develop a written sequence aligned with PSAT/SAT data and the new Com-
mon Core Standards. In addition, Crowley took responsibility for drafting a 
document outlining what excellent teaching looks like at Cristo Rey Boston 
High School.  The principal and deans observed teachers and gave feedback 
to each one 14-16 times per year.  A system in which each teacher is evaluated 
twice per year in a process that involves self-assessment and an assessment by 
the principal and deans was implemented.  The goal of the observation and 
evaluation system was to create a culture of ongoing reflection and continual 
learning.
Turnaround Stage 3:  Continuous Improvement
During the 2011-2012 school year, Cristo Rey Boston High School had a popu-
lation of 311 students, 49% of whom were Latino, 44% African American, with 
an average family income of $26,013 and household size of 3.7 (Cristo Rey 
Network, 2011a). The class of 2012 experienced 4 years of the new academic 
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program and made substantial improvements.  
An analysis of PSAT composite scores from sophomore year showed that 
the graduating classes of 2009, 2010, and 2011 scored at or below the national 
average for Black and Latino students of 1092. When comparing the last 3 
nonproficiency years to the first 2 years of students to undergo the new ninth 
grade program (classes of 2012 and 2013), the latter increased the average com-
posite by 8% (see Figure 3). The drastic and consistent increase over 2 years was 
evidence that the new freshman program was working.  After 1 year in Cristo 
Rey Boston’s freshman academic program, students who entered high school 
below grade level were able to beat the national average for Black and Latino 
students.
We required all of our seniors to take SAT tests, something only seen in 
Boston’s elite high schools.  From 2009 to 2011, our average SAT scores were 
below the national average of Latino and African-American students.  In the 
fall of 2011, however, our senior class, the first group to undergo the new cur-
riculum, scored 80 points above the national average for students of color (see 
Figure 4).  The improved scores confirmed that what we had been doing for the 
past 4 years was working.  In addition, for the third straight year, every senior 
was accepted to one or more 4-year colleges.  Of the class of 2011, only three 
students did not enroll in a 4-year college upon graduation.  One went to a 
2-year community college, and two joined the military.  
Looking Forward
We are still very much a school in a turnaround.  Our biggest challenge has 
been that only slightly more than half of the students who start with us 
as freshmen will graduate 4 years later.  Each student who leaves our high 
school is counseled into another school, and it is rare for a student who 
leaves our school to drop out of high school altogether. We are not satisfied, 
however. 
The challenge we face is similar to other Cristo Rey schools.  Of the en-
tering ninth graders of the class of 2011, 53% remained at our school through 
graduation, and nationally 52% of ninth graders graduated from a Cristo Rey 
school 4 years later (Cristo Rey Network, 2011a).  The majority of students 
who leave Cristo Rey Boston and the other Cristo Rey schools do so because 
of academic reasons. 
To become a successful turnaround, we need to retain more students, which 
requires us to do a better job of responding to the needs of our lowest-per-
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forming students.  “Rapid Achievement Gain Schools,” defined by the Mas-
sachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education for their 
ability to close the achievement gap more quickly than other schools, have a 
“well-orchestrated system of ongoing data collection and analysis that informs 
Figure 3: PSAT Composite Scores
 
Figure 4:  SAT scores of Cristo Rey Boston High School, Classes of 2008 through 
2012
 
Note:  Dark blue = Cristo Rey Boston scores; Light Blue = average SAT scores of Black and Latino 
students; Medium Blue = average SAT score nationwide and is essentially the achievement gap between 
students of color and white students.
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a continuously responsive and adaptive system of tiered instruction directly at-
tentive to students’ specific academic needs” (Institute for Strategic Leadership 
and Learning, 2012, p. 10).  Our goal in 2012-2013 is to build on our proficiency 
program by implementing a new reading program for ninth grade students. 
Our teachers will undergo a training program in literacy as well, and over time 
we will add more staff to serve students with learning differences.
We remain excited about partnering with other high-performing schools 
to learn and improve. In 2012-2013, our teachers will work with faculty from 
Boston Collegiate Charter School and a nearby public school, the Burke High 
School, to align our curriculum with the new common core state standards. Our 
goal is to be the very best school in Boston for students who, upon entering 
high school, are reading and doing math one to two grades below level. We 
want to prepare every one of these students to enter and graduate from college. 
Putting the Cristo Rey Boston Turnaround in Context
Cristo Rey Boston High School’s turnaround was not driven by a standardized 
test requirement, state regulations, or the potential loss of state or federal fund-
ing.  No one came from the outside and mandated a turnaround.  The Cristo 
Rey Boston turnaround was about fulfilling a mission deeply embedded in the 
school community, rather than an effor by outsiders with a lofty but detached 
vision.  Change came because the principal and eventually the faculty came 
to a better understanding of the effective practices associated with successful 
schools.  The Cristo Rey Boston turnaround meant taking on a proud culture 
not open to looking honestly and critically at data.   
A 2010 report from the Century Foundation suggests that school turn-
arounds require a change in the parent and student mix at the school (Kahlen-
berg, 2010).  Their researchers argue for the creation of schools that have mid-
dle- and lower-income students.  Cristo Rey Boston High School, which now 
serves more low-income students than it did previously, is a compelling chal-
lenge to that assumption.  
A critical difference from other turnaround efforts is that because change 
was not mandated from an outside group, Cristo Rey’s turnaround felt organic 
and bottom-up to faculty and staff, a feeling that is integral to any improve-
ment effort designed to last, including one mandated from an outside agent. 
Teacher leaders, including Wagner and Crowley, were eager for a new direction. 
The arrival of the Cristo Rey program to their school made change possible. 
Medina, who kept his distance and avoided long dialogues with faculty who 
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were skeptical of the changes being made, had a style that was well received by 
those who wanted change.  “Jose has a knack for making students and teachers 
feel they’ve decided to make a change that in fact he had planned long before,” 
explained Wagner.  
Considerations for School Leaders Attempting a Turnaround
The Cristo Rey Boston experience teaches several lessons to school leaders at-
tempting a turnaround.  
Critical analysis of practice.  Like any successful turnaround, the leader-
ship of Cristo Rey Boston focused on student outcomes.  Leaders of a school 
attempting a turnaround must take a hard and honest look at what various as-
sessment data say about teaching and learning in the school.  Faculty and staff 
need the freedom to question what they do, ask honestly whether the school is 
adding value to its students, and acknowledge that changes are needed in what 
and how they teach.  
Commitment and accountability.  Everyone in the school’s leadership 
must commit to change and understand the work it entails.  Getting teachers 
to change what and how they teach is a daunting task that can overwhelm any 
well-meaning leader.  The board and superintendent or president must provide 
the principal and faculty the support they need to initiate changes.  “It took 
moral courage to realize we weren’t delivering on our promises, face the facts 
honestly and openly, and commit to change,” said Wagner.  “This is where 
Jeff’s and Jose’s leadership is important.  Without them, we would have done 
what many schools have done, which is hide from reality until they quietly 
close.”
Continued innovation and risk taking.  For a turnaround to work, leaders 
must be willing to change often in order to meet the needs of their students. 
An advantage to the Cristo Rey Boston turnaround was that faculty felt em-
powered to innovate.  The principal and his teachers looked for ways to im-
prove and to help their students learn more.  They were not bound by mandates 
from the central office of a school district or charter management organization. 
They were empowered to try new ways to teach students and to modify their 
approach as they moved along.  
Identify and engage key leaders.  It is important for the school leader to 
identify allies in the effort to implement change and to identify early who is or 
who is not on board with the changes.  Medina, Wagner, and Crowley worked 
hard, explained to teachers what change would entail, and set a standard for 
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teacher performance that others could emulate.  “The most successful process 
results in people leaving of their own free will when they discover how much 
work it takes to avoid implementing the new programs,” explained Wagner. 
“Clever leaders find ways to make staying and resisting less appealing than 
leaving.”  
Establish credibility.  It is critical for school leaders to establish credibility 
and good faith when attempting a turnaround.  The most difficult part of a 
turnaround is balancing a clean break with the past and honoring both the 
past and the present.  Cristo Rey Boston’s faculty did not give up on the sopho-
mores, juniors, and seniors they were teaching in 2008-09, even though their 
focus was on a new ninth grade curriculum.  “We were committed to getting 
our students to the right colleges, to teaching them as well as we could,” said 
Medina.  “We didn’t say we’re helping the freshmen and forgetting about the 
rest of the student body.”  
“When schools fail to properly value those in front of them because the fu-
ture is the greater priority, it becomes very difficult to shed the negativity and 
resentment that result,” said Wagner.  “It would have been great if our turn-
around had happened when we converted, but there is also some advantage to 
having two stages of change (one in 2004 and the next in 2007) because we 
never abandoned ourselves to the future at the expense of the past.”
Foster buy-in across the entire school community.  Successful turn-
arounds must draw upon the skills and knowledge of a dedicated and engaged 
staff.  “Buy-in is important,” explained Crowley.  “We all felt like we had a 
part in the changes.  We were not making changes because we were told to.”
Leverage resources.  School leaders have multiple sources of resources and 
support when making change. Cristo Rey Boston’s educators visited high-per-
forming charter schools, asked College Board for guidance, and sought help 
from other successful educators.  There are educators who have been successful 
at making changes in schools, and they are excellent resources.
The right leadership.  The Cristo Rey Boston turnaround was driven by 
Fr. Medina and two teachers who were energized by the vision he had for the 
school. They believed in their students’ ability to achieve at higher levels and 
were able to convince their colleagues to work for this vision.  
Conclusion
The underlying inspiration for the turnaround of Cristo Rey Boston High 
School was a moral one:  School leaders knew their students deserved some-
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thing better than what they were receiving in the classroom.  The task was 
never to save a school or improve a public image or meet state standards.  The 
turnaround happened because school leaders decided to deliver the education 
they joined the school to provide in the first place.  Cristo Rey Boston High 
School’s transformation can be a model for schools determined to better serve 
their students.  Change will take moral courage, but there are educators across 
the country, who, if supported, can take similar steps to those taken by a group 
of leaders in Boston who dramatically changed their school.
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